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Abstract
During the last years the relationship between financial development and economic growth has
received widespread attention in the literature on growth and development. This paper
summarises in its first part the results of this research, stressing the growth-enhancing effects of
an increased interpersonal re-allocation of resources promoted by financial development. The
second part of the paper seeks to identify the determinants of financial development based on
Diamond's theory of financial intermediation as delegated monitoring. The analysis shows that
the quality of corporate governance of banks is the key factor in financial system development.
Accordingly, financial sector reforms in developing countries will only succeed if they strengthen
the corporate governance of financial institutions. In this area, financial institution building has
an important contribution to make.
JEL classification: 016, 040, G21, G38, D 82
Keywords: Financial Development, Economic Growth, Corporate Governance, Asymmetric
Information, Financial Intermediation3
Introduction1
“The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are
wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little
else.”2
John Maynard Keynes' concluding statement in the General Theory is every bit as true now as it
was sixty years ago when the book was first published. The most recent example of the
phenomenon he was describing is the development of the new growth theory - or, as it is also
known, endogenous growth theory - which, building on a paper by Paul Romer and one by
Robert E. Lucas, came into being during the mid-1980s.3 Its appearance led to a veritable flood
of theoretical and empirical contributions in the various branches of economics, and in the 1990s
the new growth theory has clearly become the premier field of research activity in
macroeconomic theory.4 A further example is the new theory of finance which is grounded in the
economics of information and which in the meantime has come to be regarded at least as an
equal partner of neoclassical capital market theory.5 Even a rather selective analysis of working
papers and publications issued by the IMF, the World Bank and the EBRD shows that the
                                               
1  The author is grateful to Stephan Boven, Reinhard H. Schmidt and Marcel Stremme for helpful comments.
The usual disclaimers apply.
2 Keynes, J.M. (1964), The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, New York and London, p.
383.
3 See Romer, P. (1986), Increasing Returns and Long Run Growth, in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94,
pp. 1002 - 1037; Lucas, Robert E. (1988), On the Mechanics of Economic Development, in: Journal of
Monetary Economics, Vol. 22, pp. 3 - 42. Important refinements in terms of the specification of the
theoretical model employed - in the sense that new combinations of assumptions regarding the state of the
(economic) world were introduced - are to be found in the following contributions: Romer, P. (1990),
Endogenous Technological Change, in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, pp. 1187 - 1211; Grossman,
G.M. and E. Helpman (1991), Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, Cambridge; and Aghion, P.
and P. Howitt (1992), A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction, in: Econometrica, Vol. 60, pp. 323 -
351.
4 This becomes especially clear if one looks at modern American university textbooks; see, for example,
Romer, D. (1996), Advanced Macroeconomics, New York, et.al., and Barro, R.J. and X. Sala-i-Martin
(1995), Economic Growth, New York et. al.
5  The following may be regarded as pioneering works in the development of this new theory: Akerlof, G.A.
(1970), The Market for "Lemons": Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, in: Quarterly Journal
of Economics, Vol. 84, pp. 488 - 500, Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling (1976), Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, p.
305 - 360 and Stiglitz, J.E. and A. Weiss (1981): Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,
in: AER, Vol. 81, pp. 393 - 4104
influence of both theories on thinking at these institutions, which are of such great importance
for the economic development of many countries, is considerable.
In recent years, a great many contributions have been published which seek to integrate the
relevant findings of proponents of both of these theories.6 In the first part of the present paper
(sections 1-3) the results of this research are summarised with the aim of identifying factors
which may help to answer the following question: Why do economies which have a developed
financial system exhibit higher per capita growth rates than economies whose financial systems
are underdeveloped? The analysis begins by considering the results of recent empirical research
which was motivated by the development of the new growth theory and answers this question as
follows: The financial system not only serves to facilitate the intertemporal resource transfer, but
also - and this is its most important achievement - effects an interpersonal re-allocation of
resources. This re-allocation has positive growth effects if the recipients of the resources have
better investment opportunities than those who provide the resources.
The second part of the paper (sections 4-6) seeks to identify the determinants of financial sector
development. Starting from the empirical fact that a sizeable number of countries have been
unable to stimulate the development of their financial systems, it explores the question of why it
is difficult to set in motion, and organise over time, a successful process of financial system
development. In the search for an explanation, the discussion relies primarily on the central
model of the theory of financial intermediation which was developed by Diamond.7 This model is
used to derive a frame of reference for endogenous financial system development by asking the
following question: What are the conditions and assumptions which, in Diamond's model,
produce the outcome that financial intermediaries are capable of efficiently carrying out the
intertemporal, interpersonal resource transfer? The answer implies that setbacks in the process of
financial system development may be due to the fact that these assumptions and conditions have
not been fulfilled. It turns out that with this approach, the quality of the corporate governance of
banks is identified as the key factor in financial system development. Specifically, the availability
of mechanisms which can ensure that banks are soundly governed, and thus that both technical
and moral mismanagement are avoided, is the decisive prerequisite for successful financial
                                               
6  For a brief recapitulation, see Pagano, M. (1993), Financial markets and growth: An overview, in: European
Economic Review, April 1993, Vol. 37, pp. 613 - 622; as well as  Levine, R. (1996), Financial Development
and Economic Growth - Views and Agenda, Working paper 1678, The World Bank, Washington, DC;
Galetovic, A. (1994), Finance and Growth: A Synthesis and Interpretation of the Evidence, International
Finance Discussion Papers No. 477, Washington DC.
7  See Diamond, D. (1984), Financial Intermediation as Delegated Monitoring, in: Review of Economic
Studies, Vol. 51, pp. 393 - 414.5
system development. If this prerequisite is given, the process of financial system development
will have positive growth effects. But it also turns out that financial system development will be
growth-promoting only if this prerequisite is given.
Proceeding from this insight, section 6 deals with the following question: Can financial sector
reforms, including the reform of banking supervision and regulation, help to set in motion a
sound process of financial system development? While the answer given is basically affirmative,
it also suggests that a number of other assumptions must also fulfilled, and that this process
takes a very long time. It can be accelerated, but efforts to speed things up will not prove to be
meaningful, or in fact even feasible, unless they they seek to improve the quality of corporate
governance of banks and other financial institutions, as sound corporate governance must be
regarded as the very heart, and motor, of financial system development. In this area, financial
institution building has an important contribution to make.
1. New growth theory and financial development
The popularity of  new growth theory8 among both scholars and economic policy-makers, can be
attributed above all to two things:
1. The new theory succeeds in eliminating two implications of the old, neo-classical growth
theory which were extremely unsatisfactory from both a theoretical and an empirical point of
view:
a) a change in the saving and investment rate, i.e. in capital accumulation, has only an effect
on the long-run equilibrium of the level of real per capita income but not on its rate of
growth.
In other words, the old theory implied that by increasing capital accumulation an economy
will not succeed over the long term in boosting the growth rate of real per capita income.
This is not only at odds with the intuitions behind what many economists thought and wrote
both before and after the formulation of neo-classical growth theory; it is also incompatible
with the empircal facts, which show that the growth of real per capita income correlates
                                               
8 Fairly non-technical surveys can be found in the Journal of Economic Perspectives (1994), Vol. 8, No. 1,
which explores endogenous growth theory in detail via a symposium. The authors are Paul M. Romer, Gene
M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, Robert M. Solow and Howard Pack.6
positively with the rate of savings and investment.9 The new growth theory formulates
models which demonstrate a positive influence of the savings and investment rate on the
long-term real per capita growth rate.10
b) the most important variable which, over the long term, determines the growth rate of real
per capita income, namely the rate of technical progress, is assumed to be exogenous, i.e.
it is not explained as the result of rational economic actions taken by agents.11
The new growth theory describes the process by which technological progress/change is
created endogenously, either as a by-product of physical or human capital accumulation,12 or
as targeted investment undertaken by rationally calculating firms in a model of monopolistic
competition.13
2. The new theory offers economic policy many new avenues by which it can influence growth
processes: research policy, trade policy, policy in the area of patents, education policy and
industrial policy.14 Structural and institutional factors can now also be regarded as
determinants of growth.15
                                               
9 See Barro, R. J. (1991), Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries, in: Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 106, pp. 407 - 444.
10 These models are known as “Ak” models, and their key charactistic lies in the fact that the employment of
physical capital in the production of goods is subject to marginal returns which are no longer declining but
constant.
11 Accordingly, David Romer summarises the explanatory power of traditional neoclassical growth theory as
follows: “..., it is only a small exaggeration to say that we have been modelling growth by assuming it.”
Romer, D. (1996), p. 25.
12 This type of model, which has its origins in the work of Arrow, is the characteristic feature of the
contributions of Romer, P. (1986) and Lucas, R.E. (1988), and has been labelled the “learning-by-doing”
approach.
13 These “innovation based growth models” are the distinguishing feature of the contributions of Romer, P.
(1990); Grossman, G.M and E. Helpman (1991); and  Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (1992).
14 These areas of policy intervention were enumerated by Paul Romer; see Romer, P. (1994), The Origins of
Endogenous Growth, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 8, p. 21.
15 In this connection, Ramser speaks of the “market organisation” as an determinant of economic growth; see
Ramser, H.J. (1993), Grundlagen der “neuen” Wachstumstheorie, in: Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium,
Vol. 22, p. 123.7
The world of economic research has responded to these new insights and the postulation of
these new policy options with a series of theoretical and empirical investigations whose goal is to
ascertain the key determinants of economic growth.16
On the face of it, the focus of the new growth theory on processes in the real economy would
seem to leave little room for a theoretical analysis of the correlation between financial
development and economic growth. Thus, it is not surprising that empirical investigations have
established the financial sector as a credible determinant of growth. In 1989, working in the
tradition of McKinnon and Shaw, Alan Gelb had already pointed to the correlation between
indicators of financial development and economic growth.17 The next major contribution along
these lines was that of Robert King and Ross Levine, who succeeded in demonstrating via cross-
country regressions18 that variables which capture the level of financial asset formation in an
economy contribute significantly to explaining why economies exhibit a given average per capita
growth rate over long periods of time.19 Examples of such variables are
- the ratio of liquid liabilities, equalling currency held outside of the banking system plus
demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and nonbank financial intermediaries, to GDP
(DEPTH);
- the ratio of credit issued by the banking system to private enterprises to GDP (PRIV/Y);
- the ratio of domestic credit issued by deposit banks to domestic credit issued by deposit
banks and the central bank (BANK);
                                               
16 Critics see this relatively large number of options as evidence of an arbitrary quality which tends to reduce
the practical relevance of the new growth theory in economic policy-making to zero; see, for example,
Mankiw, N. G. (1995), The Growth of Nations, in: Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 25, p. 309;
as well as Ramser, H. J. (1993), p. 122f.
17 See Gelb, A. (1989), Financial policies, growth and efficiency, Working paper no. 421, The World Bank,
Washington, DC.
18 A cross-country regression is based on a sample of countries, putting on the left-hand side each country's
average growth rate over a long period (for example, 30 years) and on the right-hand side a set of variables
expected to determine that growth rate. For a detailed overview of cross-country regressions in the context of
economic growth which deals with the underlying methodology involved, the way in which they are to be
interpreted, and their strengths and weaknesses, see Levine, R. and S.J. Zervos (1993), as well as Mankiw,
N.G. (1995), p. 301ff.
19 See King, R.G. and R. Levine (1993), Finance, entrepreneurship, and growth, in: Journal of Monetary
Economics, Vol. 32, pp. 513 - 542.8
- the ratio of claims on the nonfinancial private sector to domestic credit (PRIVATE).
Indeed, compared with other fiscal, monetary and trade-policy indicators, these indicators of the
level of financial development prove to be quite robustly associated with growth.20
Table 1, which presents selected findings of King and Levine, gives a brief overview of the most
basic statistical evidence on financial development and economic growth, i.e. contemporaneous
correlations between the above-mentioned financial indicators and the real per capita growth rate
for 80 countries over the period 1960-1989.
Table 1:  Contemporaneous correlations between financial indicators and the real per
capita growth rate
DEPTH PRIV/Y BANK PRIVATE
GYP 0.56 0.37 0.44 0.50
Source: King, R.G. and R. Levine (1993), p. 530
Thus, to sum up, it may be concluded that “successful” development of the financial system - in
the sense that the values calculated for the indicators of financial development described above
are high - goes hand in hand with a high real per capita growth rate. However, the correlation
between the various financial development indictors and the real per capita growth rate is not
sufficient to imply that a causal connection exists between these two variables in the sense that
financial development is a precondition for an increased rate of growth.21 In addition, more
comprehensive empirical analyses show that the positive correlation between the indicators of
financial development and the real per capita growth rate is not a constant, but rather that
                                               
20 See Levine, R. and S.J. Zervos (1993), p. 428. The positive correlation between financial system development
and economic growth can be measured not only with the help of variables which capture the level of financial
asset formation in the banking system. The formation of financial assets on stock markets, as shown by
various indicators of stock market development like size, liquidity and risk diversification, also exhibits a
positive correlation with the real per capita growth rate. See Levine, R. and S. Zervos (1996), Stock Market
Development and Long-Run Growth, in: The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 10, pp. 323 - 339.
21 “It is unclear whether the relation between growth and financial sophistication isolates the effect of an
exogenous improvement in the financial system on the growth rate, or, in reverse, reflects the impact of good
growth prospects on the incentive to develop the financial sector.” Barro, R. J. and X. Sala-i-Martin (1995),
p. 443.9
- as the level of development in the economies studied rises, the significance of the correlation
declines;22 and that
- in so far as the quantitative relationships are concerned, there are significant regional
deviations which can even determine whether the correlation will be negative or positive - as
shown, for example, by the fact that a negative correlation was calculated for a sample
consisting of twelve Latin American countries.23
The following are two further empirical findings which suggest that the link between financial
development and economic growth is rather complex:
- Studies of the western industrial countries show that by far the largest share of physical
capital accumulation is financed by firms internally. Despite the increasing liberalisation of
financial systems, the significance of internal financing has tended to increase rather than
decrease: at 69.3%, the share of internally financed investments is lowest in Japan, and
highest in Great Britain, where it works out at 97.3%.24
The predominance of internal over external financing in business expenditure on physical
capital is not a new phenomenon. It was also a characteristic of the phase of the
industrialisation process in the latter half of the 19th century.25 Contrary to many beliefs
about the significance of bank finance in German industrialisation, the evidence shows that in
most cases, internally-generated funds were by far the most important source of investment
finance for industrial companies. Of 11 large firms in the Ruhr steel industry, only one had an
internal financing ratio of less than 60% during the period 1878-1914.
While the significance of internal financing is also great in developing countries, self-
financing is not as dominant in such nations as it is now, and has been in the past, in the
western industrial countries. Firms had an internal financing ratio of more than 50% in only
                                               
22 See De Gregorio, J. and P.E. Guidotti (1992), Financial Development and Economic Growth, IMF Working
Paper WP/92/101.
23 Ibid.
24 See Mayer, C. (1989), Myths of the West - Lessons from Developed Countries for Development Finance,
Working paper No. 301, The World Bank; Mayer's findings are confirmed by Corbett, J. and T. Jenkinson
(1996), The Financing of Industry, 1970 - 1989: An International Comparison, in: Journal of the Japanese
and International Economics, Vol. 10, pp. 71 - 96.
25 See Edwards, J. and S. Ogilvie (1995), Universal Banks and German Industrialization: A Reappraisal, CEPR
Discussion Paper, No. 1171.10
three out of the ten countries covered by the sample of countries analysed by Singh and
Hamid.26
- Crisis-like developments within the financial system are accompanied by high output losses
(see Table 2). This is true now, and was also true in the past.27 Whether countries do or do
not face financial crises is an important determinant of the response of the real sector to the
development of the financial indicators.28
Table 2: „Percentage Change in GDP Five Years before and after the Initiation of 
Bank Insovency, 1975 - 1994 (No. of observations in parenthesis)
Region Mean GDP Growth
Five year before crisis Five year after crisis
All Crisis Cases* 3.2%
(290)
2.0%
(240)
subsample
OECD countries* 2.8%
(50)
1.8%
(52)
Non-OECD countries* 3.3%
(240)
2.0%
(188)
Memo:
non-crisis countries** 2.2%
(80)
2.3%
(64)
* A t-test (significant at P<0.05) indicates that the pre- and post-crisis means differ.
** Since there was no crisis in these countries, the sample was split in half, i.e., 1980-87 for the first
observation and 1988-94 for the second, Although it should not be necessary, a t-test indicates that there
was no significant slowdown in the non-crisis countries.
                                               
26 See Singh, A. and J. Hamid (1992),  Corporate Financial Structures in Developing Countries, IFC Technical
paper No.1, Washington, DC.
27 See Mishkin, F. (1991), Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises: A Historical Perspective, in:
Hubbard, R.G. (ed.), Financial Markets and Financial Crises, Chicago, pp. 69 - 108, Caprio, G. and D.
Klingebiel (1996), Bank Insolvency: Bad Luck, Bad Policy, or Bad Banking?, Paper prepred for the World
Bank’s Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, DC, and Caprio, G. (1997), Safe
and Sound Banking in Developing Countries - We’re Not in Kansas Anymore, The World  Bank, Working
Paper No. 1739, Washington, DC.
28 See Johnston, B.R. and C. Pazabasiogly (1995), Linkages Between Financial Variables, Financial Sector
Reform and Economic Growth and Efficiency, IMF Working paper WP/95/103.11
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, and Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996.“ 29
Two broad conclusions can be drawn from the empirical evidence:
1. Financial system development is an important factor in the growth process of an economy.
However, experience has shown that not every process of financial system development is
accompanied by high economic growth - as illustrated by the example of Latin America - and
that the correlation between financial system development and economic growth becomes
weaker as the income level rises. Moreover, in quantitative terms the financial system is not
as closely involved in the process of real capital accumulation as might have been expected,
at least not in the sense that it provides the funds to finance investment by productive
enterprises, since by far the largest share of business investment undertaken in a given period
is financed internally.
2. Financial system development is a difficult process. This is shown not only by the history of
recurrent financial crises, but also - again - by the fact that even in countries with a well
developed financial system a large proportion of business investment is financed internally.
Thus, if we wish to analyse the nature of the links between financial system development and
economic growth, we must answer two questions:
a) Why is financial system development important for the growth process of economies?
b) Why is financial system development difficult?
2. The central function of a financial system: The intertemporal, interpersonal
transfer of resources
The significance of financial system development for the growth process may be inferred from
the functions which the financial system fulfils, or is supposed to fulfil, in an economy. Merton
and Bodie distinguish six basic or core functions30:
                                               
29  Caprio, G. (1997), p. 5.
30 See Merton, R.C. and Z. Bodie (1995), A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing the Financial Environment,
in: Crane, D. B. (ed.), The global financial system: a functional perspective, Boston, p. 5.12
a) the clearing and settling of payments to facilitate trade,
b) the pooling of economic resources and the subdividing of shares in various enterprises,
c) the transfer of economic resources through time, across borders, and among industries,
d) the managing of risk,
e) the provision of price information to co-ordinate decentralised decision-making by different
sectors of the economy, and
f) the overcoming or mitigation of incentive problems due to asymmetric information.31
However, the financial system cannot fulfil any of these functions unless it performs one central
function - Merton and Bodie call it the “primary function” - namely, that of intertemporal and
interpersonal resource transfer.32 Now we must seek to determine the extent to which the
financial indicators enumerated above tell us whether the financial system is performing this
central function.
The first two indicators of financial development mentioned in the preceding section show, for a
certain point in time, the extent to which an intertemporal, interpersonal resource transfer is
being effected in an economy via the banking system. The level of liquid liabilities in the banking
system is a measure of the resource transfer from the non-financial sector to the financial sector;
the level of lending by the banking system to the private sector reflects the extent of the resource
transfer back to the non-financial sector. Accordingly, as regards the first two financial
indicators, the results of the cross-country regressions can be summed up as follows: the more
                                               
31 In the literature one encounters differing notions as to the precise number and nature of the individual
functions; see, for example, Merton, R.C. and Z. Bodie (1995), p. 26ff.; Levine, R. (1996), Financial
Development and Economic Growth - Views and Agenda, Working Paper No. 1678, The World Bank,
Washington, DC; and Stiglitz, J. (1992), The Role of the State in Financial Markets, Institute for Policy
Reform, p. 13, for an overview of the range of differing views on the functions of a financial system
32 See Merton, R.C. and Bodie, Z. (1995), p. 12. After all, the first five presuppose the intertemporal and
interpersonal transfer of resources, and it only makes sense to formulate the final function if such a resource
transfer takes place.13
extensive the intertemporal resource transfer organised by the banking system, the higher the
average per capita growth rate.33
By contrast, the other two financial indicators tell us more about who the recipient of the
resource transfer from the banking system is (private sector as opposed to public sector) and
who undertakes the resource transfer (commercial banks vs. central bank). This differentiation
with respect to the recipient and the initiator of the resource transfer suggests that the individual
resource transfers do not all have the same impact on growth. Thus, the formulation of the
correlation between financial system development and economic growth is modifed as follows:
the more loans which the banking system, represented by the commercial banks as opposed to
the central bank, disburses to the private sector as opposed to the public sector, the higher will
be the average growth rate of real per capita income.
We have now established a link between the financial indicators and the central function which
the financial system is supposed to fulfil. Now we must seek to answer the question of why the
performance of this function has growth-promoting effects.
3. Links between the intertemporal, interpersonal transfer of resources and economic
growth
Neoclassical theory, which provides the basis for both the new and the old theory of growth,
proceeds from the notion of a Robinson Crusoe economy. It analyses economic activities from
the perspective of a single agent who is faced with the task of allocating a given quantity of
resources intertemporally in a utility-maximising manner. In modern theory, Robinson Crusoe is
embodied by the representative agent, with the function of representation encompassing the
entire private sector, comprising all private households as well as all firms. The operative notion
here is that, ultimately, firms belong to the private households, i.e. that “the firm is simply a veil
with value measured by the present value of its net returns.”34
                                               
33 Moreover, as has been mentioned above, the financial indicators which do not relate to the development of
the banking system, but rather to development of stock markets, point to the same result, i.e. they show a
correlation with the growth rate of real per capita income. However, in the case of stock market transactions,
the financial sector merely fulfils a co-ordination function, i.e. it is not itself the recipient and initiator of the
resource transfer - it does not operate as a financial intermediary.
34 Burda, M. and C. Wyplosz (1993), Macroeconomics - A European Text, Oxford et al., p. 49.14
This model provides - under certain assumptions - a precise analysis of the optimality conditions
of the intertemporal resource transfer, i.e. of the extent to which the representative agent should
forgo consumption, accumulate capital, and allocate resources over time.35 Thus, determining
whether or not this intertemporal resource transfer will consistently generate positive per capita
growth of real income is merely a question of determining the properties of the underlying
production function, i.e. ascertaining whether physical capital used in the production of goods
exhibits decreasing (traditional growth theory) or constant (new growth theory) marginal
returns.
By contrast, the financial system effects not only an intertemporal, but also an interpersonal
resource transfer. The latter, though, cannot be captured by a model which relies on the
construct of a representative individual.36 This means that the model implicitly assumes every
form of financing activity to consist of internal financing. In order to build a bridge to empirical
reality, in which external financing can also be observed, it is assumed that the intertemporal,
interpersonal transfer of resources via external financing has no impact on either the range of
options for carrying out the intertemporal transfer of resources or the optimality conditions of
that transfer: an “increase in wealth occurs regardless of whether firms borrow to finance the
investment or use their own savings”37 - or, as it is formulated in the Modigliani-Miller theorem:
“the market value of any firm is independent of its capital structure.”38
                                               
35 The model was developed in 1928 by Ramsey - see Ramsey, F. (1928), A Mathematical Theory of Saving, in:
Economic Journal, Vol. 38, pp. 543 - 559 - and forms the basis of modern macroeconomic theory.
36 Transactions on financial markets thus pose great problems for the neoclassical model world with its
representative agent because they inherently imply that two agents undertake two actions whose respective
economic effects are at odds with each other. Thus, the occurence of a transaction on a stock market means
that one agent expects prices to fall and the other expects them to rise. As a result, the two agents cannot be
aggregated to form a single, representative individual. See Tobin, J. (1980), Asset Accumulation and
Economic Activity, Oxford, p. 26; a similar line of reasoning is advanced in Gertler, M. (1988): Financial
Structure and Aggregate Economic Activity: An Overview, in: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol.
20, p. 565. For a discussion of fundamental problems of the representative agent model, see Kirman, A.P.
(1992), Whom or What Does the Representative Individual Represent?, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives,
Vol. 6, No. 2, S. 117 - 136.
37 Burda, M. and C. Wyplosz (1993), p. 49.
38 Modigliani, F. and M.H. Miller (1958), The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of
Investment, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 48, p. 268.15
The empirical correlation between financial system development and economic growth
contradicts this theoretically derived statement. This means that the model does not capture
important forms of growth potential due to its inherent construction:39
1. Various agents have investment opportunities whose productivity differs, which means that it
is not feasible to fully exploit the growth potential of an economy until the interpersonal
transfer of resources has been organised.
2. Investment opportunities are not infinitely divisible: larger investments exhibit a higher
marginal productivity, which means that - even if every agent had access to the same
investment opportunities - the growth potential of an economy would not be utilised unless
the interpersonal transfer of resources had been organised.
By definition, interpersonal resource transfer does not produce additional capital. It enables the
available resources to be better utilised. In other words, “a financial system contributes to
growth and development by mobilizing saving and then efficiently allocating the saving across
investment projects.”40 That taking advantage of this opportunity which a functioning financial
system offers can have a decisive influence on growth in economies becomes clear if we
remember that even in economies and periods in which weak economic growth was - and is -
observed, this weakness of growth can hardly be explained by referring to an absolute shortage
of capital:41: “After all, it is not true that early economies were incapable of accumulating large
amounts of physical capital. What is striking about investments like those in pyramids, raised
field systems, cathedrals, and possibly even flood control and irrigation systems is both the size
                                               
39 This had already been pointed out by McKinnon and Shaw in their critique of the old, monetary growth
theory. See McKinnon, R.I. (1973), Money and Capital in Economic Development, Washington DC; and
Shaw, E.S. (1973), Financial Deepening in Economic Development, New York, London, Toronto.
40 Gertler, M. and A. Rose (1994), Finance, public policy and growth, in: Caprio, G.; Atiyas, J. and J.A.
Hanson (eds.), Financial reform, Theory and experience, Cambridge, p. 15.
41 Apart from the empirical facts, the concept of a capital shortage, in an absolute sense, is difficult, if not
impossible, to define because “gross national income is always and necessarily sufficient to finance, to buy
and pay for, gross national product.” (Gurley, J.G. and E. S. Shaw (1960), Money in a Theory of Finance,
Washington, DC, p. 20). Statements to the effect that developing or transitional economies, for example,
suffer from a capital shortage are thus meaningful only if such economies are compared with another
economy or other economies which have more capital at their disposal. Thus, not only at this basic
conceptual level but also in terms of their relevance for economic policy-making, such claims do not differ
very much from the statement that, compared with the United States of 1997, the United States of 1797
suffered from a severe shortage of capital. On this point, see also Flassbeck, H. (1985), Zur Theorie des
Kapitalmangels, in: Ehrlicher, W. and Simmert D. (eds.), Der volkswirtschaftliche Sparprozeß, Beihefte zur
Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 9, pp. 159 - 176.16
of the social investment involved and the relatively low rate of return it generated. If large
unexploited investment opportunities were present in early times, it is hard to understand why
they were not pursued.”42
The answer to the implicit question here is: because many agents were not, or are not, given a
chance to pursue their investment opportunities, which were, or are, more productive than those
of agents who had, or have, capital.43 To be sure, a functioning financial system is only one of
the prerequisites that must be given in order for agents to have this chance.44 In economies
which are organised on market principles, however, this is an essential prerequisite. If this
prerequisite is given, the empirical correlation between financial system development and
economic growth can be formulated as follows: Financial deepening counteracts the depressing
effect of capital deepening on the marginal product of capital45 by facilitating a continuous
interpersonal re-allocation of resources which, at the level of the economy as a whole, keeps the
                                               
42 Romer, P. (1990), Increasing returns and new developments in the theory of growth, in: Barnett, W.A. et. al.
(eds.), Equilibrium Theory and Applications, Cambridge MA, p. 97. A detailed analysis of an important
phase of German economic history which is generally regarded as a period of capital scarcity, and one which
serves to confirm the broad conclusion which Romer draws, is found in Borchert, K. (1961), Zur Frage des
Kapitalmangels in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland, in: Jahrbücher für
Nationalökonomie und Statistik, pp. 401 - 421. Easterly and Fischer also show that the weak growth in the
former Soviet Union in the 1970s and '80s cannot be attributed to a general shortage of capital, but rather was
a consequence of the insufficient productivity of resource employment; see Easterly, W. and S. Fischer
(1995), The Soviet Economic Decline, in: The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 341-371.
43 The validity of this statement is confirmed by the experience of practically every micro finance institution.
Even a superficial analysis of the profitability of micro and small enterprises shows that the marginal
productivity of the economic activities carried out by this target group is much higher than the “market
level”. Thus, Zeitinger  is correct when he speaks of a “democratisation of credit” which is achieved by micro
finance institutions; see Zeitinger, C.P. (1986), Democratizar, Profundizar y Descentralizar el Sistema
Financiero, in: Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros y del Conevneio Peru (ed.), Cajas Municipales de
Ahorro y Credito, Lima, pp. 17 - 40.
44 Only for reasons of completeness the self-evident fact should be mentioned that, in order for this to be
feasible, not only a financial system is required, but also many other, more fundamental prerequisites, e.g.
one must be able to speak justifiably of economic agents - something that, for example, was not possible in
centrally planned economies. Moreover - and this is a prerequisite which is universally acknowledged to be
essential because it represents a fundamental precondition for any type of economic activity which implies an
interpersonal resource transfer - a legal and judicial system must be in place which makes it possible for one
party to a contract that has been concluded to take legal action to compel another party to that contract to
meet his/her obligations as stipulated in that contract if that party should fail to fulfil them. For a discussion
of the significance of legal parameters for the organisation of the interpersonal resource transfer, see Sirri,
E.R. and P. Tufano (1995), The Economics of Pooling, in: Crane, D. B. (ed.), The global financial system: a
functional perspective, Boston, p. 82ff., and Krahnen, J.P. and R.H. Schmidt (1994), Development Finance as
Institution Building, Boulder, Co, pp. 33ff..
45 See Helpman, E. (1992), Endogenous macroeconomic growth theory, in: European Economic Review, Vol.
36, pp. 237 - 267.17
marginal return of capital from declining. Since it can be assumed that the private sector exploits
investment opportunities which are significantly more productive than the investments
undertaken by the public sector46 financial deepening which involves the private sector as
opposed to the public sector should lead to a higher rate of growth of per capita income.
As has already been suggested,47 this proposition was at the heart of the “message” of the new
development finance literature of the 1970s: The growth of many developing countries is
impeded because the financial system is prevented by a policy of financial repression from
efficiently carrying out the growth-promoting process of the interpersonal transfer of resources.
As regards economic policy, the conclusion that followed from this was that the financial system
had to be liberalised in order to usher in a process of economic growth. Experience showed,
however, that liberalisation often did not have the desired positive impact on growth, but rather
led ultimately to financial crises, recession and/or a revival of inflation.48 Thus, it is not surprising
that the cross-country regressions for those Latin America countries in which a thoroughgoing
liberalisation programme was implemented in the financial sector in the 1970s and '80s show a
negative correlation between financial system development - as measured by the financial
indicators - and economic growth.
Consequently, the statement that financial system development promotes economic growth must
be qualified: a financial system contributes to growth and development by mobilising saving if it
efficiently allocates the saving across investment projects. Thus, if the link between financial
system development and economic growth is to be explained satisfactorily, the basic neoclassical
model must not only be extended in such a way as to permit the derivation of the growth effects
of various forms of financing. Indeed, the assumptions must also be modified in such a way that
financing can be be defined as a problem, thus refuting the Modigliani-Miller theorem, which
posits the irrelevance of the particular form of financing selected. This is achieved by the new
theory of finance which is grounded in the economics of information.
                                               
46 None of the large-scale investments mentioned by  P. Romer has its origin in the private-sector.
47 See footnote 38.
48 See Diaz-Alejandro's article, which has come to be regarded as a classic discussion of this phenomenon:
Diaz-Alejandro, C. (1985), Good-Bye Financial Repression, Hello Financial Crash, in: Journal of
Development Economics, Vol. 19, pp. 1- 24.18
4. The new theory of finance and financial system development
4.1 Fundamental aspects
The new theory of finance which is grounded in the economics of information substitutes for the
assumption of complete, uniformly distributed information the assumption that information is
asymmetrically distributed between lender and borrower in order to be able to demonstrate the
relevance of financing. The existence of asymmetrically distributed information gives rise to
moral hazard and adverse selection problems, i.e. it involves the risk for the lender (principal)
that the behaviour of the borrower (agent), during or after the implementation of an externally
financed investment, will not be congruent with the interests of the lender. This can create a
situation in which market relationships that would be profitable for both parties - and this is the
case if the borrower has a better investment option than the lender - do not come about.49
For this reason, the organisation of the intertemporal, interpersonal transfer of resources, i.e. of
external financing, is a relevant economic problem to which agents respond with a great many
different forms of financing, each of which makes use of certain mechanisms to mitigate moral
hazard and adverse selection problems. Examples of such mechanisms are screening, self-
selection, und monitoring.50 What they all have in common is that the borrowers must relinquish
something which forms part of their "inner life", either information (e.g. balance sheet ratios,
business plans, market position, socio-economic position) and/or assets (collateral, participation
using own funds) in order to ensure that the interests of the lender and borrower are congruent
before, during and after the implementation of the externally financed investment, and thus to
render the provision of external financing possible. Accordingly, the utilisation of the above
mechanisms represents an attempt to simulate the conditions of internal financing, in which, by
definition, neither moral hazard nor adverse selection problems can occur because lender
(principal) and borrower (agent) are identical.51
                                               
49 For a classic discussion of this point, see Akerlof's analysis: Akerlof, G.A. (1970) and, as regards financing
relationships, see Stiglitz, J.E. and A. Weiss (1981).
50 See Gertler, M. and A. Rose (1994), p. 25.
51 Following Merton and Bodie, we can describe the objective of these mechanisms as that of creating between
lender and borrower “a strongly interdependent utility function”, and thus of imitating the conditions which
are characteristic of informal financing relationships, particularly within a family (Merton, R.C. and Z. Bodie
(1995), p. 9).19
If we give due consideration to these aspects, we will be in a position not only to explain the
above-mentioned empirical fact that internal financing is by far the most frequent form of
financing, followed by debt financing by financial intermediaries and the provision of financing
via financial markets,52 but also to formulate the condition that must be met in order for financial
system development to be conducive to growth:
The growth-promoting effects of the financial system are an outgrowth of its
capacity to carry out an intertemporal, interpersonal resource transfer, with
such effects being contingent on its ability to overcome information- and
incentive-related problems which are associated with this resource transfer.53
Commercial banks are particularly well suited to overcome information and incentive problems
efficiently because they can organise the resource transfer not merely once and with a single
borrower, but with respect to many borrowers, i.e. they can exploit economies of scale.
However, if these economies of scale are to be tapped, it is essential that the process of
overcoming the information- and incentive-related problems associated with the transfer of
resources from the bank's depositors to the bank does not end up creating costs which offset, i.e.
cancel out, this advantage. It was Diamond who demonstrated that this is not the case.54 Given
that his model greatly influenced the theory of financial intermediation, it makes sense to take a
brief look at the idea which forms the core of the model.
4.2. The Diamond model of financial intermediation:
Financial intermediaries as delegated monitors
The starting point for the analysis is a direct credit relationship between a borrower, an
entrepreneur who wishes to carry out an investment project, and a lender, who wishes to, or is
supposed to, finance the investment. Both parties, lender and borrower, are aware of the
                                               
52 The theoretical rationale for this empirical fact has been provided by Myers, S. C. and N.S. Majluf (1984),
Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have,
in: Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 13, pp. 187 - 221.
53 In this sense, helping to overcome or mitigate incentive problems due to asymmetric information (function f
in the list enumerated by Merton and Bodie) is not one of the primary functions of the financial system.
Rather, its ability to do this is the essential precondition which must be given if it is to be able to perform its
primary function, that of carrying out the intertemporal and interpersonal resource transfer.
54 See Diamond (1984).20
expected return to the project and of the risk associated with it. The expected return is higher
than the market return (R), whereby the risk includes the possibility of failure, i.e. the possibility
of a return of zero. Since both parties are risk-neutral, the investment - or, as the case may be,
the financing of the investment - is advantageous for both lender and borrower.
The financing problem results from the fact that the information on the return which the
investment project will generate is distributed asymmetrically: While the borrower can observe
the return directly, the lender will incur costs if it wishes to determine the return which has in
fact been realised. This may induce the borrower to announce, on the repayment date, a return to
the investment project which is lower than the one which was in fact achieved so as to minimise
its payment obligations vis-à-vis the lender. Thus, the borrower exhibits moral hazard behaviour,
i.e. it acts against the interests of the lender.
It is assumed that the borrower has no resources of its own which the lender can claim should a
return be reported which is lower than the market return R. In this sense it is not possible for the
borrower to signal to the lender by means of an appropriate equity participation or the provision
of loan security that an identity of interests obtains between the two parties, i.e. that it will only
report a return lower than R if the return generated by the investment in fact turns out to be less
than R.
Diamond proposes two possible ways of solving the information and incentive problem:
a) Borrower and lender design a loan contract under which the borrower incurs non-pecuniary
costs (NPK), e.g. a severe loss of reputation, if it reports a return which is lower than R. On
the one hand, these non-pecuniary costs ensure that the borrower will only report the return
as being lower than R if this is in fact the case. The information and incentive problem which
was created by the asymmetrical distribution of information is solved in this way. On the
other hand, the non-pecuniary costs represent deadweight costs for the borrower55 because
they are also incurred if the return is in fact lower than R - an outcome which can certainly
occur, since it has been assumed that the investment project involves the risk of failure.
b) The lender monitors the borrower, i.e. bears costs equal to K.
                                               
55 Jensen and Meckling speak of “residual loss”; see Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling (1976), Theory of the
Firm: Mangaerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, in: Journal of Financial Economics,
Vol. 3, pp. 305 - 360.21
In the case of a direct credit relationship between a single lender and a single borrower, the
decision rule is thus as follows: the monitoring costs (K) will be borne if they are less than the
non-pecuniary costs of the contract in the absence of monitoring: K < NPK.
In Section 2, organisation of the process of pooling of economic resources and of that of
subdividing shares in various enterprises was identified as one of the core functions of the
financial system, on the one hand because this renders large-scale investments - which can be
expected to exhibit a higher marginal productivity - possible, and, on the other, because it
minimises the risk incurred by investors. This means that frequently many (m) investors will be
involved, or will have to be involved, in the financing of an investment project. However, this
leads to a corresponding decline in the attractiveness of the monitoring solution since monitoring
costs equal to m*K are incurred.56 For this reason, it makes sense to use the services of a
financial intermediary in order to delegate monitoring to it, which makes it possible to bring the
monitoring costs back down to K.
In order for this to be feasible, it must be possible to solve the information- and incentive-related
problems that now arise between the financial intermediary/commercial bank and the lenders/the
bank’s depositors in such a way as to minimise the costs to which they give rise. Diamond calls
these costs delegation costs (D) because it is the aim of the bank’s depositors to delegate to the
bank the task of monitoring the borrowers. It is advantageous to use the services of financial
intermediaries if the sum of monitoring costs (K) and delegation costs (D) is less than the non-
pecuniary costs which would be imposed on the final borrower or the monitoring costs of many
lenders:
K+D £ £ min [NPK, m*K].
Diamond shows that under certain conditions the delegation costs (D) will be very low. In order
for this to be the case, the following prerequisites must be given:
- The financial intermediary must have concluded a deposit contract with the depositors in
which the bank guarantees the depositors a return equal to the market return R. It must have
bolstered the credibility of this return guarantee by designing the contract such that the bank
                                               
56 In addition, because a lender thinks that all other (m-1) lenders will also monitor the actual return, it may
decide to become a free rider, i.e. cease monitoring. Since all lenders will think this way, a classic free rider
problem is created.22
incurs high non-pecuniary costs if it should be unable to meet its payment obligations to the
depositors.
- The financial intermediary must finance a great many projects, and thus have a
correspondingly well diversified portfolio.
If these prerequisites are given, the delegation costs incurred with the financial intermediary are
zero because the high non-pecuniary costs represent an incentive for the bank to in fact monitor
its borrowers. The idea here is analogous to that, on which the advantageousness of monitoring
in a direct lender-borrower relationship is based: monitoring occurs if the non-pecuniary costs
which are incurred if the reported return is less than R are greater than the monitoring costs. For
this reason, depositors will conclude a deposit contract with the bank under which the non-
pecuniary costs of a payment which is less than R exceed the bank's monitoring costs with
respect to its borrowers. Thus, monitoring of the borrowers is in the bank's own interest, which
means that the depositors can be sure that the bank will in fact monitor its borrowers.
In the case of a direct financing relationship between lender and borrower, the non-pecuniary
costs represent an additional burden for the borrower (deadweight costs) since it must also bear
these costs if the reportable return is in fact lower than the market return. As has already been
noted, the probability of this outcome is relatively high in the case of a single investment project.
But compared with the position of the lender in a direct financing relationship, the position of a
bank gives it a decisive advantage: it can conclude loan contracts with many borrowers. Thus, to
the extent that this gives the bank a well diversified portfolio, the probability that a bank will in
fact not be able to pay R, and hence be forced unjustly to bear the non-pecuniary costs, is zero.
The reason for this is that the average return on the investment projects of the monitored firms is
- in accordance with the assumptions - greater than R, which means that if portfolios are
sufficiently large and well diversified, a minimum portfolio return equal to R will in fact be
achieved, provided the bank does in fact monitor the borrowers. However, this also implies that
the bank never has to bear the high non-pecuniary costs, i.e. that they equal zero. As a result,
compared with the direct relationship between one borrower and many (m) lenders, the bank
continues to enjoy an economies-of-scale advantage with respect to monitoring costs (K <
m*K), and does not incur any additional costs due to its role as borrower from its (m)
lenders/depositors. Accordingly, commercial banks may be regarded as efficient institutions for
the organisation of the intertemporal, interpersonal resource transfer in so far as the resolution of
information- and incentive-related problems is concerned.23
4.3 Banks as delegated monitors: Model and reality
The result achieved with Diamond's model points to new ways of explaining the positive
correlation between financial system development and economic growth. In particular the
correlation between the volume of lending by commercial banks - as opposed to central bank
lending - and the average growth rate of real per capita income can now be explained: unlike
central banks, which (are supposed to) fulfil monetary-policy functions, commercial banks
perform monitoring tasks, which renders the efficient financing of productive investments
feasible. For this reason, lending by commercial banks is a particularly appropriate measure of
financial system development, which appears to exhibit a particulary close correlation with the
growth rate of real income.57 As regards the design of financial systems, the recommendation to
economic policy makers which can be derived from the model is also straightforward: a financial
system which relies on banks can support the growth process of economies.58
But this positive message of the Diamond model should not obscure the empirical fact that,
particularly during the last fifteen to twenty years, there has been a pronounced increase in the
number of bank failures and financial crises in both the industrial and the developing countries.59
While macoeconomic and terms-of-trade shocks certainly contributed to the rise in the number
of bank failures, it is equally clear that “poor banking” has been an important factor here: "In all
the countries in the sample (Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, the Philippines, Spain, Thailand and
Uruguay - A.W.) poor risk diversification, inadequate loan evaluation, and plain fraud were the
main factors leading to financial institutions' liquidation or intervention."60
In view of this negative empirical evidence, it makes sense to bear in mind precisely what the
Diamond model is: we should regard it as a model, a frame of reference. In other words, it is not
a description of the reality of banks and banking. Rather, it “merely” describes conditions under
which banks can solve information and incentive problems in an efficient manner, and thus
                                               
57 Accordingly, this correlation forms the point of departure for models which integrate the new growth theory
and the new theory of finance; see, for example, King, R.G. and R. Levine (1993), pp. 516 - 528.
58 A representative discussion of this point, focusing on the creation or reform of financial systems in the
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, is found in Corbett, J. and C. Mayer (1991), Financial
Reform in Eastern Europe: Progress with the wrong model, in: Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 7,
No. 4, pp. 57 - 75.
59 See Caprio, G. and D. Klingebiel (1996), Caprio, G. (1997)
60 Sundararajan, V. and T.J.T. Balino (1991), Issues in Recent Banking Crises, in: Sundararajan, V. and T.J.T.
Balino (eds.), Banking Crises: Cases and Issues, Washington DC, p. 16.24
organise the interpersonal, intertemporal transfer of resources. As a result, the model is a very
suitable instrument for arriving at an answer to the question of when a financial system will
produce financial deepening of the type capable of contributing to increased economic growth.61
The conditions which must be met in order for banks to solve information and incentive
problems efficiently are as follows:
1. There must be no macroeconomic risks which could could cause the expected return on a
diversified portfolio to be less than the market return R; the possibility of bank failures due to
“economic acts of God”62 is thus ruled out.
2. Banks must be able to monitor (and/or analyse) borrowers.
3. Banks must have diversified portfolios.
4. The non-pecuniary costs which would have to be borne by a bank if it failed must be so high
that they provide a sufficient incentive to the bank to monitor its borrowers, i.e. to bear the
monitoring costs which are associated with lending.
In addition to these conditions, the Diamond model also involves the assumption that the identity
of interests between borrower and bank and between bank and lender can be created in only one
of two ways: either by means of monitoring or via a contract which sets non-pecuniary costs for
the respective borrower at a level which solves the incentive problem which results from the
asymmetric distribution of information. For tractability reasons, other mechanisms for the
solution of information and incentive problems are not considered.
There can be no doubt that these conditions are not met, and that this assumption is not valid, in
the real world:
                                               
61 The positive growth impacts of the financial system can be captured even if an economy is undergoing a
financial crisis. The reason for this is that the crisis is usually accompanied by large-scale dislocations in the
real economy which can be attributed, at least to some extent, to an inability on the part of the financial
system to continue to perform its functions. For a classic discussion of this point, see Bernanke, B. (1983),
Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression, in: American
Economic Review, Vol. 73, pp. 257 - 276.
62 See Fetter, F. W. (1931), Monetary Inflation in Chile, International Finance Section of the Department of
Economics and Social Institutions of Princeton University, Princeton; cited in: Caprio, G. (1997), p. 21.25
- In the real world, macroeconomic risks exist which can negatively influence the
creditworthiness of bank borrowers, measured in terms of their ability to earn, on average,
the market return R. And because this is so, the ability of banks to meet their payment
obligations with regard to their depositors is also reduced.63 As has already been noted,
macroeconomic shocks and adverse macroeconomic developments are an important cause of
bank failures.
- There are many banks whose capabilities in the area of (analysis and) monitoring are
insufficiently developed and whose portfolios are highly concentrated. The fact that the
possibility of practices and policies of this type - i.e. “bad banking” - is ruled out in
Diamond's model is, however, not an outgrowth of an ad hoc assumption. Rather, it follows
from the model's inherent logic. And that logic stipulates that the non-pecuniary costs which
banks must potentially bear when they mobilise deposits must always be assumed to be high
enough so that the banks will either undertake the investments needed to acquire the
requisite monitoring skills, or already possess such skills. The same incentive ensures that the
banks will maintain adequately diversified portfolios.
- The comparison between the model and the real world yields a similar result if we look at the
question of whether banks in fact wish to monitor. This problem comes up over and over in
conjunction with agent or pocket banks and their connected lending activities, and here as
well, Diamond sees the solution as being provided by the central characteristic of the deposit
contract, i.e. the level of the non-pecuniary costs. Within the bounds of his model's inherent
logic, he resolves this problem in a satisfactory manner, and thus there is no need to deal with
it explicitly.
Summing up the results of the comparison, it is accurate to say that, apart from the problem of
macroeconomic risks, it points to the overriding significance of non-pecuniary costs in the
deposit contract. It is these costs which - assuming rational behaviour on the part of bank
managers - cause them to pursue a policy in their asset-side (lending) business which in turn
furnishes a satisfactory rationale for assuming the utility of financial intermediation where none
existed before: the employment of an appropriate credit technology which is grounded in the
principles of monitoring and diversification. Indeed, use of this credit technology creates a
situation in which the bank does not have to bear the high non-pecuniary costs at all. In other
                                               
63 Using the example of the financial crisis in the U.S. in 1982, B. Friedman highlights this connection; see
Friedman, B. (1982), Comments and Discussion with regard to Carron, A.S., Financial Crises: Recent
Experience in U.S. and International Markets, in: Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 12, p. 419.26
words, in the Diamond model the bank's depositors successfully exercise corporate governance
functions vis-à-vis the bank's managers via the non-pecuniary costs: “It eliminates all moral
hazard or bank failure risk.“64
If the disparity between the implications of the Diamond model - in which banks are efficient
organisers of the intertemporal, interpersonal resource transfer in the presence of asymmetric
information - and the empirical facts, which show bank failures to be almost a regular occurence
- not just in developing and transition economies, but particularly in such economies65 - turns out
to be so pronounced, it must be due to one of two things:
- either the non-pecuniary costs in the real world are not high enough to cause the corporate-
governance effect of the deposit contract to be sufficiently great to induce the banks to
pursue a lending policy which gives rise to a stable banking system,
- or the non-pecuniary costs of the deposit contract are fundamentally incapable of causing
corporate governance to be exercised to a sufficient degree.
If the latter is true, then this would mean that this mechanism for the creation of an identity of
interests between the bank and its depositors must at least be supplemented by other mechanisms
which serve to overcome the problem of asymmetric information. Empirical evidence shows that
this is indeed the case.
5. Viewing financial development from the perspective of the economics of
information
It is one of the characteristics of the theory of finance which is grounded in the economics of
information that it has identifed a whole range of mechanisms which can create an identity of
interests between the two parties to a financing relationship.66 By far the most important, and
most frequently used, option in the case of a borrower-bank relationship is the provision of
                                               
64 Dewatripont, M. and J. Tirole (1996), The Prudential Regulation of Banks, Cambridge and London, p. 109.
65 Caprio speaks of a “boom in banking crises”; see Caprio, G. (1997), p. 2.
66 See, for example, Schmidt, R.H. (1981), Grundformen der Finanzierung - Eine Anwendung des neo-
institutionalistischen Ansatzes der Finanzierungstheorie, in: Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 14, pp. 186 - 221.27
suitable loan security67 or, as the case may be, participation by the borrower in the financing of
the investment project using its own funds. Even in developed financial systems, banks do not
rely solely on their (credit-analysis and) monitoring skills, but also use other mechanisms which
can overcome information and incentive problems.68 In this sense, the way in which the Diamond
model is used to describe the asset-side business of commercial banks is in need of modification.
In view of the empirical evidence, the Diamond model’s depiction of the liability-side business of
banks - in which neither the provision of security nor equity participations by the banks in their
capacity as borrowers of funds from their depositors play any appreciable role - appears to be a
more accurate representation of the reality of banking systems in the developed world. Indeed,
the equity ratio of commercial banks is usually very low, and this turns out to be the most
important difference between enterprises in the financial and non-financial sectors when one
compares the liability side of firms' balance sheets.69 This suggests that - at least in western
countries, where bank failures, while observable, are not as widespread as in developing and
transition economies - the non-pecuniary costs are sufficiently high to create an identity of
interests between depositor and bank.
While the Diamond model correctly depicts the current reality of the liability-side operations of
western banks, if we look at the history of the western banking system we see that the fit
between model and reality was much less close in the past. Above all when the process of
financial system development was just getting under way, the similarity between the the liability
side of a balance sheet for a bank and that of a non-financial firm was much greater than one
would suspect based given the pronounced difference observable today. Figure 1 depicts the
evolution of the equity ratio of American banks during the period 1840-1989.70 The data
underscore that the ratio of equity to total assets was very high at the beginning of the process of
financial system development, with the value showing a more or less steady decline once it began
                                               
67 See Terberger, E. (1987), Der Kreditvertrag als Instrument zur Lösung von Anreizproblemen:
Fremdfinanzierung als principal/agent-Beziehung, Heidelberg, p. 39.
68 The relative significance of loan security also increases with the efficiency of the legal system as a
mechanism for the foreclosure and liquidation of collateral, and also in proportion to the costs of (credit
analysis and) monitoring.
69 See Greenbaum, S.I. and A. V. Thakor (1995), Contemporary Financial Intermediation, Fort Worth et al., p.
49.
70 The figure is taken from: The Department of the Treasury (1991), Modernizing the Financial System,
Washington DC.28
to fall. A similar evolution can be observed if one looks at the historical data on the share of
equity capital in the balance sheet total of German commercial banks.71
Fig.1: Equity as a percent of assets for all insured U.S. commercial banks, 1840 -
1989
Evidently, none of today’s highly developed banking systems - and thus no bank - started out as
a “Diamond bank” which was established by many (m) lenders/depositors as an instrument of
delegated monitoring. Thus, this empirical fact regarding the foundation and evolution of
banking systems and banks can only be interpreted to mean that, at this early stage of financial
system development, it was not possible to exercise corporate governance by means of
correspondingly high non-pecuniary costs in the framework of a deposit contract. Rather, the
banks’ owners had to exercise the corporate governance function. In other words, they had to
show, first of all,
                                               
71 In 1872, equity capital accounted for 45% of the balance sheet total of the German banking system. By 1900
this share had fallen to 34%, and in 1927 it stood at only 10%. By 1960 the value had declined to 5%. See
Stützel, W. (1964), Bankpolitik heute und morgen, Frankfurt, p. 4629
- that they were able, by utilising mechanisms for the resolution of incentive and information
problems, to organise an intertemporal, interpersonal resource transfer and to build up a
diversified portfolio,
- and that they were able to supply a sufficient amount of equity capital to set the development
process of a bank in motion and signal to potential depositors that they would act in
accordance with the interests of  the latter in their asset-side business.72
Thus, if we wish to understand how a (bank-based) financial system develops, we must initially
abandon the notion of a financial intermediary as it is described by Diamond. Only if we do this
will we be able to recognise the true nature of the problems posed by the development of
financial intermediaries.73 For if we assume - in line with the empirical evidence - that the
characteristics of the deposit contract will not be sufficient to overcome the incentive problems
that exist between a bank’s depositors and the bank, the order of importance and the (temporal)
sequence of the development of assets-side (lending) and liability-side (deposit) operations by
banks is the reverse of what we find in Diamond’s model. While the Diamond model suggests74
that the impetus for the process of the foundation and development of banks came from the
liability side, due to the fact that many lenders wished to minimise monitoring costs, the
empirical evidence suggests that it was a successful asset-side business which fuelled the
development of financial systems. The reason for the formulation of this differing view is that in
the Diamond model it is not necessary to ask how, and under what conditions, asset-side
business can be successfully conducted. Rather, in Diamond’s model the incentive-compatible
funding of asset-side operations is seen as the central problem of financial intermediation.
However, the empirical evidence on the development of financial systems shows that the
successful execution of asset-side transactions is the central problem, and that it is not until later
                                               
72 “The organisers’ willingness to invest in their firm’s equity serves as a signal of the quality of the firm’s
information and the assets selected on the basis of this information.” Leland, H.E. and D.H. Pyle (1977),
Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure and Financial Intermediation, in: The Journal of Finance,
Vol. 32, p. 384.
73 If, on the other hand, the Diamond model is used as a blueprint for new financial intermediaries, or for ones
which are still in the early stages of their development, the implications for economic policy are very
straightforward: as regards the creation and development of financial intermediaries, policy-makers must
adopt a “laissez faire” approach like the one recommended in the New Development Finance literature of the
1970s; on this point see Gertler, M. (1988), Financial Structure and Economic Activity, in: Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 20, p. 577.
74 It should be noted that use of the term “suggests” is justified only in conjunction with the question “How does
a financial system develop?” Since Diamond does not even ask this question, use of the term “suggests”
should not, and in fact must not, be understood as a form of criticism of the model.30
- not until after this problem has been solved - that the incentive-compatible expansion of the
pool of resources availble to fund lending - becomes the focus of attention.
Historically, the evolution of the banking systems of advanced industrial countries - which
developed in the private sector of those countries' economies - exhibits the following
characteristics:75
- Banks were founded by firms or private individuals whose successful business operations in
the framework of their non-financial enterprises had enabled them to accumulate an
appreciable amount of capital, which they then, as the owners of financial institutions, made
available to other firms via those institutions.
- The newly founded banks concentrated initially on asset-side transactions with non-financial
firms
- with whose activities they were quite familiar due to their own previous experience in the
real economy (i.e. the newly established banks already had the requisite credit-analysis
and monitoring skills, and they also knew that an effective demand for external financing
existed), and
- whose activities could be financed without incurring very high costs for analysis and
monitoring.
This is the why firms often entered the banking business via the provision of short-term trade
credits,76 and why newly created banks limited their activities to a specific region,77 and why,
                                               
75 See Neal, L. (1987), Development of Financial Institutions, in: Eatwell, J.; Milgate, M. and P. Newman
(eds.), The New Palgrave: A Dictionary in Economics, Vol. I, A - D, p. 659 - 662. The description of the
development of the German financial and banking sysem, which is cited as an illustrative example, is based
on Tilly, R. (1967), Germany, 1815 - 1870, in: Cameron, R. (ed.), Banking in the Early Stages of
Industrialization, New York et. al., pp. 151 - 182; Feldenkirchen, W. (1982), Kölner Banken und die
Entwicklung des Ruhrgebiets, in: Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte, pp. 81 - 106; and Hauswald,
R.B.H. (1995), On the Origins of Universal Banking: An Analysis of the German Banking Sector 1848 to
1910, Stanford University, mimeo.
76 The empirical evidence shows that major bank failures in early German financial history were often
attributable to the fact that the banks involved did not adhere to these principles, but rather lent to unknown
industrial firms which were difficult to analyse and monitor - e.g. the “Bank für Handel und Industrie zu
Darmstadt” or the “Schaaffhausener Bankverein”. See Tilly, R. (1967), p. 162 und Feldenkirchen, W. (1982),
p. 89.
77 See Feldenkirchen, W. (1982), p. 90; Hauswald, R.B.H. (1995), p. 8.31
at least in the initial years of their development, they usually had highly concentrated
portfolios.78
- During the initial years of their business operations, the increase in banks' total assets was
funded almost exclusively by retained earnings. External financing of banks via deposits
played hardly any role at all, and demand deposits in particular were scarcely utilised as a
source of funds.
- The expansion of the financial system correlated with the increase in the number of options
available for securing loans.
For this reason, financial intermediaries should be seen as firms which, at least in the early stages
of their development, do not differ significantly from non-financial firms with regard to either the
asset or liabillity side of their balance sheets. In so far as the activities on the asset side of the
balance sheet of financial intermediaries are concerned, this has the following implications:
(1) Financial intermediaries provide a specific product: the efficient organisation of external
financing, i.e. the efficient organisation of the intertemporal, interpersonal transfer of
resources.79 This presupposes that information and incentive problems are overcome by the
employment of a certain financial technology,80 i.e. the utilisation of the mechanisms
described above.
(2) The provision of this product necessiates investments: intermediaries must first acquire
screening and monitoring capabilites. These investments have to be financed.
                                               
78 That this transition period is necessary can be seen from the development of the German banking system:
"The portfolios held by German banks in the late nineteenth century seem to have been quite risky. ... Indeed,
quite a few of the banks went under, so the risks did affect the banks' depositors as well. Given this
observation, the analysis of banking and financial intermediation must go beyond Diamond and study again
the relation between banks and their depositors under conditions that involve a non-negligible probablility of
bank failure." Hellwig, M. (1990), Banking, financial intermediation and corporate finance, in: Givannini, A.
and C. Mayer (eds.), European financial integration, Cambridge, New York, p. 49
79 "A bank can be simply thought of as a firm whose activity is to make loans." Stiglitz J.E. (1992), Explaining
Growth: Competition and Finance, Paper prepared for Villa Mondragone International Economic Seminar on
“Differences in the Rates of Growth: Globalization or Regionalization of the Processes of Endogenous
Growth, Rome, p. 40.
80 Calomiris specifically uses the term "financial technology" in this connection; vgl. Calomiris, C.W. (1993),
Financial Factors in the Great Depression, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 70.32
(3) Financial intermediaries only undertake these investments if they are regarded as profitable,
i.e. there must be an effective demand for this product.
As regards its liability-side business, this perspective implies that, over the short-to-medium
term, a bank cannot assume that it will be able to fund its operations by attracting deposits which
are contractually safeguarded by means of correspondingly high non-pecuniary costs which are
incurred in case the bank should fail. The reason for this is that, in its asset-side business, the
bank does not yet fulfil the conditions (ability to monitor, and demonstrated intention to monitor;
diversified portfolio) which would render funding of this type possible. This is why, due to the
information and incentive problems involved, financial intermediaries must pass through the
same stages of development as non-financial firms. Thus, the description of this process of
development given by Gertler and Rose for a non-financial firm provides an apt characterisation
of the evolution of a bank, as well:
When the bank starts up, it has a low net worth for two basic reasons: Its financial resources and
collaterizable assets are limited, and its horizon is - due to its limited experience in monitoring
and its by definition highly concentrated portfolio - unsure. The cost of external finance is high,
accordingly. The bank relies heavily on internal funds to finance investments. Over time it
accumulates financial assets. By establishing a track record and gaining experience, it raises the
market's assessment of its survival probability. The resulting rise in net worth makes obtaining
external finance feasible. The likely first candidate is credit from depositors, who have intimate
knowledge about the quality of the bank’s lending activities, since net worth is probably still
insufficient to eliminate gains from evaluation and monitoring. As the bank grows further and
establishes a more certain horizon, it may eventually reach the point where net worth is sufficient
to obtain direct deposits from the public, acting as delegated monitor via a deposit contact which
implies large non-pecuniary costs in the event of failure.81
This gives us a stylised picture of the phased, endogenous development of a financial system
which has been derived on the basis of the new theory of finance (see Chart 1).
During the first phase, which we shall call the accumulation phase, non-financial firms finance
their activities primarily via retained profits, i.e. they accumulate capital internally. On the one
hand, this capital structure serves as evidence that they exhibit an effective demand for external
financing provided by financial intermediaries. On the other hand, a not insignificant share of
these financial intermediaries will be founded by firms which operate successfully in the product
                                               
81 See Gertler, M. and A. Rose (1994), p. 3233
markets, the reason for this being that - once the prerequisites for the provision of external
financing under the conditions of asymmetrically distributed information are given - an
investment in financial intermediation is profitable.
Chart 1: Stylised depiction of endogenous financial system development
Accumulation phase:
Non-financial firms finance their operations via retained profits, thus building up equity capital.
Some of these firms found the first financial intermediaries.
ﬂ
Probation phase:
Financial intermediaries begin to lend. Because their monitoring capabilities are still very limited
and their portfolios are still very concentrated, lending must be funded primarily with own
resources.
ﬂ
Expansion phase:
The quality of the financial intermediaries' monitoring skills increases; their accumulated loan
portfolios are increasingly diversified. For this reason, the most highly developed institutions
begin to mobilise deposits.
ﬂ
Mature phase:
Financial intermediares develop into “Diamond banks”.
During the second stage of development, which we shall call the “probation phase”, lending by
financial intermediaries to firms begins. Because the financial intermediares can themselves do
little or nothing that would enable a potential creditor to overcome information and incentive
problems (collateral, participation using own funds on a sufficient scale), thus creating an
identity of interests between creditor and debtor, initially the intermediaries must finance their34
operations exclusively via retained profits. Attracting deposits is either not possible at all, or
feasible on only a very limited scale and under very specific conditions.82
During the expansion phase, those financial intermediares which are best at supplying the
product “provision of credit” extend the scope of their activities. As they do so, funding
constraints are increasingly eliminated because the intermediaries increased their capital during
the probation phase, which in turn makes it easier for them to attract additional resources.
During the final phase, the mature phase, this occurs in the form described by Diamond, i.e. via
the standard debt contract for the mobilisation of deposits.
6. Financial development and corporate governance
6.1 Corporate governance via banking regulation and banking supervision
The stylised picture of an endogenous process of financial system development, which was
derived from the empirical evidence on financial system development in the western industrial
countries as viewed from the perspective of the economics of information, may be seen as a
renewed attempt to define an appropriate frame of reference - this time for determining how
financial systems should develop. Although the example of western industrial countries played an
important role in the delineation of this framework, it cannot be regarded as a description of how
the process of historical development actually unfolded. Indeed, even in those countries which
today have the most advanced financial systems, the evolution of those systems was anything but
smooth.83 On the contrary: in the final analysis, financial crises were what prompted economic
                                               
82 As has already been noted, the substance of these conditions can be summed up with the help of the technical
term “interdependent utility function”: such an interdependent utility function, i.e. an identity of interests,
must already exist between the creditor and the debtor prior to the initiation of the financing relationship.
This is, for example, often the case within a family, and this is why funds obtained from family members
often account for a considerable share of the external financing provided to economic agents. This also
applies to business start-ups and to firms during the first few years of their existence. For a representative
discussion of this phenomenon, see Pierenkemper, T. (1990), Zur Finanzierung von industriellen
Unternehmensgründungen im 19. Jahrhundert - mit einigen Bemerkungen über die Bedeutung der Familie,
in: Petzina, D. (ed.), Zur Geschichte der Unternehmensfinanzierung, Berlin, pp. 69 - 97. Thus, Krupp had
been in business for 24 years before it received its first bank loan; up until then the “external” financing
received by the firm had come almost exclusively from family members.
83 See, for example, Mishkin (1991).35
policy-makers to intervene in financial system development with a view to regulating the
activities of intermediaries.84
Certainly since the Great Depression, and most likely before then as well, the search for answers
to the question of how the process of financial system development can be shaped so as to
minimise the probability of crises has provided economic theory with one of its main areas of
inquiry, and defined one of the principal areas of activity for economic policy.85 The smooth
development observed in the 1950s and '60s suggested that the right answers to this question
had been found, and thus the interest of researchers in this area declined and other issues came to
dominate economic-policy debates. Over the last twenty years, though, financial system
development has been characterised by an increasing degree of instability in both industrial and
developing countries,86 and with the initiation of the economic transition process in the former
communist countries the problem of wholly inadequate financial sector development in Central
and Eastern Europe has been highlighted.87 And this has meant that the issue of financial sector
policy design has once again been given a very high priority by both economic policy makers and
those who engage in research on the theory of economic policy.88
Although recent crises, and crisis-like developments, in industrial countries and the financial
sector crises in developing and transition countries have certain common features, it appears
                                               
84 The establishment of central banks was presumably the most important intervention; see Friedman, B. M.
(1990), Implications of Corporate Indebtedness for Monetary Policy, Washington DC, mineo, p. 28. For an
explanation of the existence of central banks as counterparts to commercial banks which has been derived
from the economics of information, see Goodhart, C.A.E. (1987), Why Do Banks Need a Central Bank?, in:
Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 39, pp. 75 - 89.
85  See, for example, Milton Friedman's plan to introduce a 100% minimum reserve requirement; see Friedman,
M. (1948), A Monetary and Fiscal Framework for Economic Stability, in: American Economic Review, Vol.
37, pp. 245 - 264. It is hardly surprising that, shortly after the Great Depression, neither the proponents of
neoclassical/monetary macroeconomics nor those who followed Keynes advocated a broad-based
liberalisation of the financial system
86 For a concise overview of the relevant events and trends - as regards developing countries - see The World
Bank (1989), World Development Report 1989, Washington, DC; as well as - with respect to industrial
countries - Bank for International Settlements (1992), Annual Report, Basle.
87 At the beginning of the transition process, Bruno spoke simply of a “missing financial infrastructure”; see
Bruno, M. (1993), Stabilization and the macroeconomics of transition - How different is Eastern Europe?, in:
Economics of Transition, Vol. 1, p. 13.
88 In conjuction with the process of reform in Central and Eastern Europe, financial sector policy falls in the
category of “second-generation transition issues”; see The World Bank (1995), World Bank Discussion on
Second Generation Transion Issues, in: Transition, The Newsletter about Reforming Economies, Vol. 6, Nos.
5-6, pp. 1-6, and IMF (1996), World Economic Outlook, Washington, DC, pp. 78 - 97.36
advisable to differentiate between the industrial countries on the one hand, and the developing
and transition economies on the other: For one thing, industrial countries incurred substantially
lower costs (in terms of output declines and the implicit fiscal costs of restoring the solvency of
the financial system) as a result of crisis-like developments than developing countries have.89 For
another, the macroeconomic and institutional parameters that are involved and which shape the
environment in which policies for the resolution and avoidance of crises can be formulated, are
totally different.90 Finally, the level of development of financial systems in the industrial countries
and that of many developing and transition countries is very different. Indeed, many countries
which fall into the latter category still find themselves in one of the first two phases of financial
system development, due either to the historical legacy of earlier forms of economic, political
and social organisation, which has until recently precluded a process of financial system
development (transition countries), or to the fact that the process of development was “derailed”
at a relatively early stage and failed to pass successfully through even the first or second phase
(developing countries).
Thus, in 1994, of the 38 low-income economies for which the relevant data are available, 15
exhibited a broad money/GDP ratio of 20% or less.91 In 1980, 14 countries in the low-income
category - out of 35 - had not achieved a broad money/GDP ratio of more than 20%. Of these
14 countries, only one - Bangladesh - was able to make significant progress in terms of
quantitative financial system development, while in the case of four countries this financial
development indicator in fact declined.92 By comparison, of the twenty high-income economies
for which the World Bank publishes values for this indicator, Israel was the only one for which a
level of less than 40% was reported. Over the period 1980-1994, every high-income country
with the exception of Sweden was able to increase this indicator, in some cases by a significant
amount.
                                               
89 See Caprio, G. (1997).
90  See Mishkin, F. S. (1996), Understanding Financial Crises: A Developing Country Perspective, The World
Bank, Washington, DC.
91  In 1995, less advanced transition countries exhibited a broad money/GDP ratio of 16.8%; see IMF (1996),
World Economic Outlook, October, Washington, DC, p. 96.
92  See The World Bank (1996), From Plan to Market, World Development Report 1996, Washington, DC, p.
190/191. Of the middle and upper-middle economies, 13 were able to achieve a significant increase in
financial depth, i.e. a rise of more than 10 percentage points, during this period. This group of countries
includes all of the Asian and Gulf countries which are listed in the table.37
Consequently, many economies are still at a point in their evolution where the process of
financial system development must, for all practical purposes, start from the very beginning. And
this means that one must ask what would be the appropriate financial sector policy for such
economies, i.e. one which can ensure that this process, once it gets underway, does not come to
a standstill again. In other words, “the 'quality' of financial sector reform matters.”93
At present, the debate over ways and means of enhancing the quality of financial sector reform is
largely dominated by the notion that, while the policy of financial system liberalisation that was
implemented, and which was inspired by the financial development literature, was correct, it
must now be supplemented by measures giving greater emphasis to banking regulation and
supervision. There are two main arguments that may be advanced to make the case for placing
greater emphasis on banking supervision and regulation so as to ensure that the financial systems
in developing and transition economies evolve in such a way that their develoment will produce
positive growth effects:
1. Compared with the western industrial countries, banking supervision and regulation are
underdeveloped in many developing and transition countries: the banking supervisory regime
is less strict, and the measures taken to monitor, implement and enforce the existing
regulations are less rigorous than in western countries. Moreover, banking supervisory
agencies are understaffed and personnel are not as well qualified as their western
counterparts, and they have also not been provided with the technical means needed to
monitor banks effectively.
2. Banking supervision and regulation have the task exercising, for and on behalf of the banks'
depositors, the corporate governance function with respect to bank managers, i.e. to perform
a “monitoring service in screening, auditing, covenant writing, and intervention activities that
depositors are unable or unwilling to do for themselves. From this perspective the goal of
regulation is to provide active representation for depositors.”94
As a result, banking supervision and regulation should be designed, and implemented by the
responsible agencies, in such a way that
                                               
93 Johnston, R.B. and C. Pazarbasioglu (1995), p. i.
94  Dewatripont, M. and J. Tirole (1994), p. 6.38
- the content and the effect of the non-pecuniary costs of the deposit contract presupposed by
Diamond in his intermediation model are imitated, e.g.in the form of licence revocation or by
means of other sanctions; that
- other mechanisms which serve to overcome the information and incentive problems in the
bank-depositor relationship are incorporated to supplement the non-pecuniary costs, e.g. via
a minimum capital ratio; and that
- lending guidelines - e.g. on large-scale loans - are in force which imply the adoption and
implementation of a credit policy that will limit moral hazard in banking through
diversification.
It is evident that if this recommendation, which aims to ensure a satisfactory course of financial
system development in developing and transition economies, is followed, banking supervision
and regulation will play a key role in producing the desired outcome. In this connection, two
questions must be posed95:
1. Are conditions in developing and transition economies such that the same banking
supervisory and regulatory standards can - and should - be applied as are employed in
western financial systems?
2. In view of the broad parameters of economic and financial development which obtain in
developing and transition economies, are banking supervision and regulation in fact capable
of playing this key role?
The stylised picture which was devised to serve as a frame of reference for financial system
development suggests that the first question must be answered in the negative. In particular, the
minimum capital ratio96 should be set much higher than in western industrial countries, and it
should be made contingent on two factors:
                                               
95  The following discussion draws heavily on Caprio, G. (1997), and on personal experience acquired by the
author, who in recent years has served as a consultant to various development agencies, both national and
international financial institutions.
96  The emphasis is on “ratio”: minimum equity capital requirements which prescribe an absolute volume of
capital are less suitable because in borderline cases they serve merely to erect a quantitive barrier to entry to
the banking market, but do not permit qualitative regulation. Accordingly, the absolute minimum should be
set solely with a view to ensuring that the number of banks does not rise to a level so high that it exceeds the
monitoring capacity of the banking supervisory authority. However, if the capital ratio is sufficiently high,39
- How long has the bank been operating under the current ownership structure and with its
current management, and reporting positive results?
- How diversified is the bank's portfolio?
Here again, the Diamond model forms the theoretical background for both criteria. The first
criterion seeks to address the corporate governance problem and is based on the notion that
every new bank, and every significant change in the ownership structure and in the composition
of management, poses the question of whether, and to what extent, the existing corporate
governance structures are sufficient to prevent technical and moral mismanagement.97 The
second criterion focuses on the decisive prerequisite for ensuring that the bank's asset-side
business is such that it is prudent to mobilise deposits: the diversification of the portfolio.98
While it is still possible to derive the answer to the first question largely from theoretical insights,
answering the second question poses a primarily empirical problem, i.e. one must regard every
country as a separate case and pose this question individually for each one. There are, however,
criteria which have been derived from economic and politico-economic considerations which can
provide an indication of whether the question should be answered in the affirmative or in the
negative in a specific case. These criteria are as follows:99
                                                                                                                                                     
e.g. 50% during the first two years of a bank's operation, the required monitoring effort will probably be
small.
97  See De Juan, A. (1991), From Good Bankers to Bad Bankers, Ineffective Supervision and Management
Deterioration as Major Elements in Banking Crises, EDI working paper, The World Bank, Washington, DC,
p. 3.
98  Seen against this background, the problem of connected lending also becomes much less acute.  Based on
empirical evidence, connected lending is often considered to be one of the main causes of bank failures in
developing and transition countries. On the other hand, though, the historical development of the financial
systems of the western industrial countries shows that, when they first started operating, banks usually
granted loans to firms with which they were connected, and in the case of Germany the banks initially lent to
firms they themselves had founded. Thus, the question of whether connected lending promotes or impedes
financial system development can only be answered if we consider the way in which such lending is funded:
if connected lending is funded with deposits explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the state, i.e. if no
corporate governance is exercised, we will hardly find it surprising that such loans are not granted using a
credit technology based on analysis and monitoring. If, on the other hand, these loans are funded with the
bank's own resources, i.e. the capital of the bank's owners, just the opposite will presumably be true: due to its
close ties to the borrowing firms, the bank will be in a position to analyse and monitor them very well and
very easily. However, an even more important point with regard to this case is that, even if this assumption is
incorrect, connected lending will not generate or contribute to financial crises because uninformed depositors
who are incapable of exercising the corporate governance function are not affected.
99 See, once again, Caprio, G. (1997).40
- concentration of wealth, income, and ownership of non-financial and financial firms in a
given country;
- presence, and effective functioning, of checks and balances in the state apparatus and in the
government.
A highly concentrated wealth, income and ownership structure and/or a rather undemocratic
government which is subject to one-sided political pressures, and which, for its part, “passes on”
such pressure to the government agencies, would suggest that the question of whether the
banking supervisory and/or regulatory institutions are able to fulfil their function of depositor
representation must be seen not only as a question of the quality of the staff training, of technical
resources, and of the nature of the accounting and legal frameworks. In other words, the fact
that the corporate governance function has been transferred to the banking supervisory authority
will only prove to be a sign that financial system development is proceeding along a sounder,
more beneficial path if the socio-economic and political power structures in a given country are
such that the banking supervisory agency is in fact able to perform this function.
6.2 Building sound corporate governance structures for banks: The narrow bank
proposal
The scepticism regarding the ability of the banking supervisory authority to assume the corporate
governance function has led to McKinnon's recommendation100 that - with one exception -
financial system development in transition and developing countries should be forced to conform
to the pattern of the frame of reference derived above. McKinnon proceeds from the following
assumptions regarding the state of the financial system and the scope for the exercise of
corporate governance:
- the banks exhibit strong technical deficiencies in terms of the design of asset-side operations;
- given the output losses which regularly accompany financial crises, and taking into account
politico-economic considerations, it appears unrealistic to assume that, in the event of bank
failures or of a general financial crisis, the depositors would participate in the losses. Thus, de
                                               
100 See McKinnon, R.I. (1992), The Order of Economic Liberalization, Financial Control in the Transition to a
Market Economy, Baltimore and London. McKinnon's proposal regarding the course of financial system
development is part of a general strategy for converting an economy - whether in a transition or developing
country - into a market economy which also takes into account macroeconomic aspects and issues of
structural policy.41
facto, the state bears the risk, either explicitly - via the organisation of deposit insurance - or
implicitly - via the government budget.101 Accordingly, even if it were possible to design
deposit contracts with high non-pecuniary costs in the event of bank failure, it is unlikely that
banks and depositors would conclude such contracts since both sides would have no
incentive to do so.
- The banks which collect deposits are not subject to corporate governance to a sufficient
degree, due not least to the structure of their liabilities, which consist in large part of
deposits. Since these are explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the state, and given inefficient
and lax banking supervision and regulation, the banks have no incentive to invest in, and then
utilise, credit technologies and lending policies which preclude an unstable course of
development.
Given that
- the banks already have deposits, and thus that in the process of financial sector development
the third step was, as it were, taken before the first one, and that
- the collection of deposits from the private sector, whether from private households or from
firms, may, in itself, be regarded as a desirable, growth-promoting strategy because it offers
investors a relatively efficient means of self-financing larger, and thus more productive,
investments via the internal accumulation of financial assets,102
McKinnon makes a “narrow bank proposal” to the effect that banks which collect deposits from
the public should be prohibited from undertaking asset-side transactions with the private sector,
i.e. that these banks should only be allowed to acquire government debt instruments or deposit
funds at the central bank. The theoretical background of this recommendation is clear: banks
                                               
101 Given that the sources of revenue available to fund the government budget are usually not sufficient for this
purpose, responsibility for dealing with the problem is, de facto, delegated to the central bank, which, via an
inflationary monetary policy which erodes the real value of the deposits, ends up saddling the depositors
with the losses in real terms after all. See Caprio, G. (1997) and Winkler, A. (1996), Macroeconomic
Stabilisation in Transition Economies - The Relevance of Financial System Development, IGS Discussion
Paper 15, Birmingham.
102 This is the core of the complimentarity hypothesis between money and capital developed in 1973 by
McKinnon; see McKinnon, R.I. (1973).42
whose corporate governance structure is inadequate may only engage in types of asset-side
business in which the possibility of moral hazard can be ruled out.103
McKinnon is willling to accept the disadvantages of this limitation, specifically the fact that
during this phase firms can only make use of internal financing or endeavour to obtain external
financing from the nonbank capital market. The reason for his willingness to accept its
drawbacks is, first, that this constraint to which firms would then be subject - the limitation of
their financing options to internal forms of financing - should not necessarily be seen as a bad
thing, or be seen exclusively as an impediment, because it forces the firms to work under a hard
budget constraint, namely that of the product market.104 And second, this constraint is, at least
during the first phase of development, not as much of an obstacle to growth as it might appear.
Third, and this is the most important argument that can be cited in favour of McKinnon’s
approach, it enables institutions to establish themselves within the nonbank capital market which
exhibit a suitable corporate governance structure. Because they grant loans or undertake equity
capital participations using own resources, they will be subject to the risk of moral hazard in
lending to a much lesser degree than banks whose deposits are explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
by the state. The probability that the principles of monitoring and diversification will be observed
is much greater.
In a second step - according to McKinnon - this nonbank capital market gives rise to financing
instruments and/or financial institutions, with the latter differing from banks as regards their
liability-side business in so far as their liabilities do not represent money, i.e. they would not be
covered by an explicit or implicit government guarantee.105 After a few years, these institutions
could apply for a banking licence; in order to ensure the security of their deposits, the scope of
the new banks' asset-site operations should, initially, continue to be quite narrow - specifically, it
should be confined to limited and collateralised short-term lending.
                                               
103 Thus, in principle this is a new, modified version of Friedman's 100% minimum reserve plan whose rationale
McKinnon derives not only from the inherent logic of financial system development but also from
macroeconomic as well as fiscal- and monetary-policy considerations.
104  „Though preliminary, the evidence suggests that forcing enterprises to rely heavily on internal finance by
imposing hard budget constraints and tight credit policies early in the transition can lay the foundation for a
recovery in fixed investment. ... However, soft budget constraints and inflationary credit policies can obscure
the ability of an enterprise to survive in a market-oriented economy and limit its eventual access to external
finance for investment“ EBRD (1994), Transition Report, London, p. 55 and 57.
105 Seen from the perspective of the approach which relies on the efficacy of a sound banking supervisory and
regulatory regime, McKinnon's proposal thus implies that institutions which grant loans to private firms
would initially have to have an equity ratio of 100% or, to put it in somewhat less drastic terms, they would
initially be prohibited from accepting deposits from the public.43
McKinnon's proposal met with only a limited response, not least because it has rather radical
implications.106 After all, in essence McKinnon is saying that, at least temporarily, a prohibition
of financial intermediation in the classic sense - that of banks mobilising savings mainly from
private households in order to channel them to productive enterprises - is necessary in order to
permit institutions to grow which have demonstrated that they are in fact capable of performing
this intermediation.107 It remains necessary for an even longer period to forgo characteristics of
financial intermediation which, in themselves, would be desirable, e.g. long-term lending to
finance investment.108 While the empirical evidence shows that more long-term finance tends to
be associated with higher productivity of firms and investment, the data shows that this will only
be true if the availability of more long-term finance is a result of endogenous financial system
development. Artificial long-term lending induced by government subsidies in the form of cheap
funding will not serve to increase the ability of firms to grow faster. In some cases subsidised
long-term loans were even associated with lower productivity. Thus, one can only conclude -
and McKinnon would certainly concur - that “institutional differences between developed and
developing country financial markets, such as the adequacy of banking and stock markets and
the legal infrastructure, are important in affecting the supply of term credit and can be changed,
though not overnight.”109
                                               
106 Cornelli, Portes and Schaffer speak, for example, of “unnecessarily extreme responses” to the weaknesses of
the banking systems in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe; Cornelli, F.; Portes, R. and M.E.
Schaffer (1996), The Capital Structure of Firms in Central and Eastern Europe, Discussion Paper No. 1392,
Centre for Economic Policy Research, London, p. 10. In the view of Caprio and Levine, implementing
McKinnon's proposal would, as it were, involve a certain risk of “overkill” - the risk that there would, in the
end, be too much of a good thing (self-finance and equity at the level of the firm); see Caprio, G. and R.
Levine (1994), Reforming Finance in Transitional Socialist Economies, in: The World Bank Reserach
Observer, Vol. 9, pp. 1 - 24.
107 The - temporary - prohibition also precludes banks from playing a role in the excercise of corporate
governance in firms because they themselves are largely ungoverned. McKinnon thus concludes that,
initially, the state should not relinquish its ownership role in large enterprises because, as long as the
financial system remains underdeveloped, only the state is capable of exercising the corporate governance
function. This sceptical attitude vis-à-vis rapid privatisation of state enterprises - particularly in the
transition economies - was also one of the reasons why, as regards liberalisation strategies, McKinnon’s
position remained a minority view.  On this point, see, with regard to the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe, Caprio, G. (1995), The role of financial intermediaries in transitional economies, in: Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol. 42, p. 278.
108 See Caprio, G. and A. Demirgüc-Kunt (1997), The Role of Long Term Finance: Theory and Evidence,
Working paper No. 1746, The World Bank, Washington, DC.
109 Caprio, G. and A. Demirgüc-Kunt (1997), p. 25.44
6.3 Building sound corporate governance structures for banks: The role of financial
institution building
While McKinnon's proposal has certainly elicited differing responses, the empirical evidence in
the transitional countries shows that in countries which have already made substantial progress
towards achieving macroeconomic stabilisation, overcome financial crises, and/or carried out
reforms in the area of banking supervision and regulation, the financial system turns out to be
quite similar to what would one would have ended up with if McKinnon's recommendations had
been followed: The banks focus almost exclusively on the acquisition of government debt
instruments and - apart from a few exceptions - almost completely stop providing financing to
firms.110 Private micro, small and medium-sized enterprises must therefore rely almost
exclusively on internal financing, and thus they exhibit a capital structure in which debt plays
only a small role.111
As a result, the decisive question, at least in so far as the transitional economies are concerned, is
not whether McKinnon's recommendation should be followed, but whether - as predicted by
McKinnon - institutions will develop out of this situation which will extend the “frontier of
finance” by incentive-compatible means, thereby initiating a sound process of financial system
development. In the long run, and assuming all other relevant factors remain unaltered (the so-
called ceteris paribus assumption), there is little reason to doubt that this will eventually happen.
The really pressing question, though, is whether the respective institutions and economies will be
able to take as much time to complete the processes involved here as the western industrial
countries took to develop their financial systems. Since “in its essentials, these countries had a
modern financial system by the beginning of this century”,112 and this development began in the
1840s,113 financial system development in western industrialised countries took around 60 years
                                               
110 See Borish, M.S. and M. Noel (1996), Private Sector Development During Transition - The Visegrad
Countries, Discussion Paper No. 318, The World Bank, Washington, DC; Stremme, M. (1997), The Benefit
of the Doubt, Russia’s overall economic situation in summer 1997, Working Paper No. 16, Internationale
Projekt Consult (IPC) GmbH, Frankfurt. Drawing on his experience as a consultant, the author can confirm
that similar features have emerged in the financial systems of Albania and Armenia. In Georgia, due to the
fact that treasury bills do not exist, the size of the consolidated balance sheet of the banking system is
negligible (less than 6% of GDP).
111 See Cornelli, F.; Portes, R. and M.E. Schaffer (1996).
112 Galetovic, A. (1994), p. 8 (source cited is Goldsmith, R. (1985), Comparative National Balance Sheets,
Chicago).
113 As regards Germany, Kindleberger concludes that, “Generally, (...) the banks of Germany remained
primitive well into the nineteenth century.” Kindleberger, C. (1993), A Financial History of Western
Europe, New York
2, p. 118.45
to complete. Thus, it is unlikely that we will simply be able to wait until an endogenous process
of financial system development, which is induced exclusively by the presence, and benign effects
of, a positive overall environment, runs its course. After all, it must be assumed that, in many
countries, it will be a long time before this positive overall environment emerges, or,
alternatively, that it will not begin to emerge until a sustainable growth process has been set in
motion. Accordingly, we must endeavour to answer a question which is put to the international
financial institutions and donors, e.g. by economic policy-makers in the relevant countries -
namely, whether there are perhaps, after all, ways of  accelerating this development process.
The answer to this question is Yes, provided the national and international financial institutions
which would like to promote financial system development support an institution building
process,114 with support being provided at all levels that have been identified as being crucial for
a satisfactory process of financial system development. Specifically, what is needed is
- technical assistance in order to enable lending to be organised in such a way as to ensure that
appropriate credit-analysis and monitoring techniques are employed and that the principle of
diversification is observed;115
- financial assistance in order to enable the process to be set in motion in such a way that it
conforms to the basic pattern defined by the theory of financial system development as
outlined above, i.e. in such a way that, at least during an initial phase, the instiution receiving
support is able to operate without collecting deposits, during which time it demonstrates that
it is capable of analysing and monitoring borrowers;
- corporate governance in order to ensure that the institution receiving support will be able to
achieve the goal of being able to perform financial intermediation, and that it will be capable
of fulfilling this function on a sustainable basis.
Up until now, the idea that the financial development process can be fostered through institution
building has been looked at almost exclusively in conjunction with, and from the perspective of,
                                               
114 See Krahnen, J.P. and Schmidt, R.H. (1994).
115 Referring to the situation in Central and Eastern Europe, Caprio states that “..., technical assistance from
abroad also appears to have been quicker at delivery at the central-bank level but understandably lagging
with respect to the more numerous commercial banks. Still, the assistance is beginning to arrive, suggesting
that greater gains can be expected.” Caprio, G. (1995), p. 270.46
micro and small enterprise promotion.116 This is understandable, given that the neglect of this
target group - which in many developing countries comprises the bulk of the economically active
population117 - by the formal financial sector, which, as measured by the financial indicators
enumerated above, will not necessarily be underdeveloped, represents a challenge not only in
terms of social policy and broad equity concerns, but also from the standpoint of financial sector
policy.118 In countries in which the overall level of financial system development is, however,
very low and/or growth in the real economy is generated almost exclusively by the activities of
micro, small and medium-sized enterprises - e.g. in many of the reforming economies of Central
and Eastern Europe119 - institution building undertaken with the goal of offering appropriate
financial services to small and medium-sized enterprises is conducive to the general process of
financial system development.120
Moreover, the provision of support for the establishment of a target group-oriented financial
institution - regardless of whether it is furnished in the context of an upscaling or downscaling
approach121 - would seem to be a particularly appropriate form of contributing to the general
process of financial system development because this approach makes it possible to imitate the
ideal-typical case of the development of a financial intermediary in an almost natural manner:
- adherence to the principle of diversification can be rapidly achieved due to the small loan
amounts involved;
                                               
116 See Schmidt, R.H. and C.P. Zeitinger (1994), Critical Issues in Small and Microbusiness Finance, Working
Paper No. 1, Internationale Projekt Consult (IPC) GmbH, Frankfurt.
117 In Peru 48 per cent of the economically active population is employed in enterprises that provide work for
four persons or less. See Lepp, A. (1996), Financial Products for MSEs - the municipal savings and loan
bankers of Peru, in: Small Enterprise Development, Vol. 7, pp. 15-24.
118 See Von Pischke, J.D. (1991).
119 See Borish, M.S. and M. Noel (1996).
120 “..., reformers should keep in mind that the financial reforms desired in TEs [Transitional Economies] are in
many respects more like financial development.” Caprio, G. (1995), p. 294.
121 In essence, the upscaling approach entails creating a new institution whose goal is to be able to offer
appropriate financial services to the target group. By contrast, the downscaling approach is geared to
overcoming the reluctance of existing commercial banks to cater to the demand of the target group of micro,
small and medium-sized enterprises by transferring to these banks a credit technology that reduces
substantially the risk-related costs and transaction costs entailed in lending to this target group.
Krahnen/Schmidt and Schmidt/Zeitinger use the terms “downgrading”und “upgrading”.47
- staff can be taught the requisite analysis and monitoring skills, both relatively easily and
relatively quickly, at training workshops providing theoretical instruction and through on-
the-job training, whereby this practical training plays a particularly important role;122
- the enterprises usually need short-term working capital loans to complement self-financed
investments in fixed assets, the extent of which will be limited in any case;123
- given that the institution will often face no competition in this market, it can supplement and
reinforce the incentive effects of collateral by employing the graduation principle: By initially
granting relatively small, short-term credits, but then gradually increasing the volume and the
maturity of loans, the institution establishes a strong incentive on the part of the borrowers to
ensure their continued, long-term access to credit by meeting all of their obligations.
Borrower and bank both grow and are involved in an interdependent process of
development;
- only a relatively small amount of funding - which should be furnished by international or
national financing institutions - need be provided in order to ascertain, during a test phase,
whether the institution is benefiting from the technical assistance and successfully applying
the know-how being transferred to it. Once the institution has demonstrated that it is
successfully carrying out asset-side operations, this should serve as proof to the central bank
(if the upscaling approach is being employed) and/or to clients in the private household
sector (if the downscaling approach is being employed) that it is now permissible for the
institution to seek actively to collect deposits, i.e. begin to carry out financial intermediation
in the classic sense, assuming an analysis of the probable costs and benefits of deposit
mobilisation has shown this to be a sound course of action.124
Here again, though, the decisive question is how one can best go about ensuring that the
institution will exhibit a corporate governance structure capable of keeping it from drifting off
into moral hazard banking - something that can happen even if its staff has received adequate
training, it has the requisite technical capabilites and has been provided with sufficient financial
resources. The international and national financial institutions can play an important role in this
                                               
122 See Wallace, E. (1996), Financial institutional development - the case of the Russia Small Business Fund,
in: Levitsky, J. (ed.), Small Business in Transition Economies, London, p. 77 and 83.
123 “Just like OECD countries, TEs need financing for trade and working capital, and it is difficult to find
examples where the banking system does not dominate this activity.” Caprio, G. (1995), p. 290.
124 For a detailed discussion of this point, see Schmidt, R.H. and C.P. Zeitinger (1994), pp. 86ff.48
context by influencing the bank's behaviour, consistently and over the long term, either by
providing credit lines125 or by acquiring an equity stake in the institution. How we answer the
question of whether existing financial institutions
- have a satisfactory corporate governance structure, i.e. have so far not engaged in small-scale
lending “merely” because they felt it would prove to be too risky and/or too costly (both of
these reasons for not wishing to serve the target group can be eliminated, at least in part, by
introducing an appropriate credit technology), or, if they do not, whether they
- at least have the potential to develop a corporate governance structure which would ensure
the sustainability of their operations and commitment to the target group, assuming an
involvement by the international financial institutions
is crucial for the decision as to whether a downscaling or an upscaling approach should be
recommended in a given case. If the answer is No - to both parts of the question - then the
upscaling approach, in which both governance structure and by-laws can in essence be designed
from scratch - is preferable. These structures must then be put in place, and their proper
operation in practice ensured, by the international financial institutions, either direcly - via an
equity participation - or indirectly - through the provision of technical and financial assistance,
with the provision of such assistance being made contingent, in so far as this is possible, on the
provider being given a seat on the institution's supervisory board.
When attempting to answer this question, it is helpful to use the criteria set forth above, which,
for their part, are intended to help one decide whether an effective banking supervisory agency
can even be established in a given economy to serve as the representative of the depositors. For,
in the final analysis, we are dealing with the same phenomenon here: institution building is not
just a function of technical assistance, training and financial support. If these were the only
factors involved, then the US$ 5 billion which Von Pischke reckons has been spent on projects
aimed at improving the credit supply for small and micro enterprises126 would certainly have had
a greater impact.
                                               
125 It becomes considerably easier to exercise the corporate governance function if the international financial
institution - as, for example, in the case of the EBRD - is able to work directly with banks without any form
of sovereign guarantee, “securing for itself the opportunity for direct communication with the partner banks,
and for intervention in their operations.” Zeitinger, C.P. (1996), Micro-lending in the Russian Federation,
in: Levitsky, J. (ed.), p. 93; for a similar assessment, see Wallace, E. (1996), p. 83.
126 Von Pischke, J.D. (1991), p. 65.49
This brings us back to the starting point of the discussion, namely the Diamond model with its
implicit emphasis on role of corporate governance: Financing is important, training is important,
and the credit technology that is selected is important. But without structures and monitoring
and control mechanisms which ensure that these three elements are brought together and
adapted so that they can mesh in practice, they will not be sufficient to ensure sustainable
success in institution building and financial development, an important element of any economic
growth process.50
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